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SUPREME COURT OPENS DOOR TO MORE STATE
REVENUES FROM MINED RESOURCES
MINING LAW-SEVERANCE TAXES: The United States Supreme
Court upheld Montana's 30% coal severance tax because it violates
neither the commerce clause nor the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453
U.S. 609 (1981).

INTRODUCTION

Regardless of conservation measures taken by the public as a result of
energy prices and shortages, total energy demand is projected to continue
increasing over the next two decades. ' Of the common energy resources,
nuclear fuel and coal demand will increase the most.' Consequently,
production of fuel and nonfuel mineral resources has been stepped up to
meet the demand. 3 The United States Supreme Court in its recent decision
in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana4 (hereinafter Commonwealth
Edison) has left the door open for the states to exploit this accelerated
rate of resource extraction. 5 Arguably, the only ceiling left on the tax rate
imposed on minerals is what legislatures and Congress wish to impose.
Traditionally, states have levied ad valorem or production taxes to
generate revenues from mined resources. 6 Ad valorem taxes tax ownership
of mining property. Although various methods of valuation of mine property have evolved, such as basing mine value on market value of the
mine or on mine output, valuation of mine property remains an inherent
difficulty in implementing these taxes. 7 Because of these valuation problems and the resultant unreliability of revenue production, ad valorem
taxes have increasingly been replaced by production taxes. 8
Production taxes are based on the act or privilege of severing minerals,
1. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, THE ENERGY FACTBOOK 81 (1980). The annual demand
growth rates per year of primary energy demand as projected are: 1.3% 1979-1985, 1.5% 19851990. Overall growth rate between 1979 and 1990 is 1.4%.
2. Id. Between 1979 and 1990 annual nuclear fuel demand is predicted to increase 10.9% and
coal demand is predicted to increase 4.0%.
3. For example, uranium production increased from 18,490 tons in 1978 to 18,730 tons in 1979.
Id. at 705. New Mexico led in U30 8 production at 7,420 tons in 1979. Id. Wyoming, Utah, and
New Mexico in that order hold the largest land areas for uranium exploration and mining. Id. at
713. New Mexico and Wyoming far outweigh other states in estimated and undiscovered uranium.
Id. at 717.
4. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
5. Even without increases in amount of tax, state revenues from taxes could increase because the
value of mineral resources mined rose from $20 billion in 1978 to $24 billion in 1979. Cooper,
Mining and Quarrying Trends in the Metal and Nonmetal Industries, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR,
I MINERALS YEARBOOK 1 (1981).
6. A good source of information, although somewhat dated, is Tippit, Oldham, Brightwell, Ad
valorem and Production Taxation of Mining Properties, 4 AM. L. MINING 701 (1963).
7. Id. at 702.
8. Id. at 702, 704.
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the business of mining, or the value of production. 9 Tax formulas for
production taxes may be based on net proceeds, gross proceeds, quantity
severed, or merely the privilege of doing business."
The courts' involvement in the taxing process has changed over the
years. At one time, the courts totally prevented states from taxing minerals
destined for other states because the privilege of doing interstate commerce was not subject to state taxation. 1 However, the "local incidents"
exception to the no tax rule soon developed. 12
In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 3 one of the best known cases which
applied the exception, the Supreme Court held a Pennsylvania coal tax
constitutional because it was levied on the coal prior to commencement
of its movement from the state. The Court rejected the notion that products
of a state could be in interstate commerce prior to being moved from the
place of their production or preparation.' 4 To hold otherwise, the Court
continued, would subject to commerce clause scrutiny the "fruits unpicked, the cotton and wheat ungathered, hides and flesh of cattle yet
'on the hoof,' wool yet unshorn, and coal yet unmined. "'" Later, it became
a word game, the constitutionality of a law riding on whether the tax
could fit into the "local incidents" exception.
For example, the Court in Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor6 held

unconstitutional a Connecticut tax levied on foreign corporations headquartered in the state for the privilege of doing business in the state. It
was irrelevant that the tax would have been constitutional had it been
called compensation for the corporations' use of the highways. Thus,
constitutionality could depend on what name a legislature gave a tax.17
A break from the formalism of these cases came when Complete Auto
Transit v. Brady" (hereinafter Complete Auto) overturned Spector Motor
Service 9 and its progeny. The Court reasoned that the existing law by its
formalism avoided the issues of the commerce clause. Complete Auto
upheld a Mississippi gross receipts tax on the privilege of doing business
in the state, and, in doing so, set forth new criteria for testing commerce
9. Id. at 702.
10. Id. at 729. License and occupation taxes are also examples of privilege taxes. Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana and New Mexico are some western states which have enacted production
or license taxes.
11. See Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
12. Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
13. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
14. Id. at 259.
15. Id. at 259-60.
16. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
17. Browde, DuMars, State Taxation of Natural Resource Extraction and the Commerce Clause:
Federalism'sModern Frontier,60 OR. L. REV. 7, 20 n. 62 (1981).
18. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
19. Id. at 288.
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clause challenges. A tax will survive commerce clause scrutiny when
there is (1) substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) fair apportionment,
(3) no discrimination against interstate commerce, and (4) fair relation
to the services provided by the state. Commonwealth Edison is one of
the latest cases to apply the test.
COMMONWEALTH EDISON
The Clean Air Act of 1970 created a demand for low sulfur Montana
coal. 2' The Montana legislature in 1975 enacted a tax schedule which
placed most of the coal mined in the state into the maximum severance
tax bracket of 30%.2
The tax enraged both coal producers and out-of-state consumers. In
June 1978, four Montana coal producers and 11 of their out-of-state utility
customers (appellants) filed suit in Montana state court requesting (1)
refund of over $5.4 million in severance taxes paid under protest, (2)
invalidation of the tax under the commerce and supremacy clauses of the
United States Constitution, and (3) an injunction against further collection
of the tax. 2 The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted.23
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the tax. 2 4 The commerce
clause issue was decided alternatively. First, the court relied on the "local
incidents" theory. That is, since severing of minerals is an intrastate
activity, a tax on severing minerals is also an intrastate activity. Therefore,
the statute is not subject to commerce clause scrutiny. The alternate ground
upon which the Montana court relied was that the tax satisfied the Complete Auto test. The court decided that the supremacy clause was not at
issue because no federal-Montana statutory conflict existed.
In taking the case under consideration, the United States Supreme Court
-determined that commerce clause restrictions apply to state severance
taxes for two reasons. 25 First, no real distinction exists between severance
taxes and other types of state taxes subject to commerce clause scrutiny
20. Generally, western coal is lower in sulphur than eastern coal. Telephone interview with James
Madison, Administrator, Miscellaneous Tax Division-Mont. Dep't of Revenue (Apr. 6, 1982).
Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of Kansas in Support of Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 3,
453 U.S. 609 (1981), stated that Wyoming and Montana together have 68% of the nation's low
sulphur coal.
21. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979). The 30% figure was quoted from Appellants,
Statement of the Case at 4, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), and confirmed in the telephone interview with
James Madison, supra note 20. One possible reason for the tax schedule change was that members
of the Montana legislature believed that with the increased demand for coal and resultant increased
value, the tax system of dollars per weight of mineral was outmoded. Supra note 19.
22. 453 U.S. 609, 613 (1981).
23. Commonwealth Edison Co. v.. Montana, Mont. -,
615 P.2d 847, 849 (1980).
24. 615 P.2d 847 (1980).
25. 453 U.S. 609, 616 (1981).
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which substantially affect interstate commerce although levied prior to
entry of the goods into the stream of commerce.26 Second, commerce
clause scrutiny will not necessarily undermine the states' taxing authority
because a tax on interstate commerce is not per se invalid. The states
have a significant interest in exacting27from interstate commerce a fair
share of the cost of state government.
The parties to the action conceded that a substantial nexus with the
taxing state and fair apportionment existed. The Court then applied the
last two prongs of the four-prong Complete Auto test.
In addressing the third prong of the test, the appellants argued that
discrimination existed because out-of-state consumers primarily bore the
tax burden. The Court dismissed this argument because the third element
concerns whether different groups are taxed equally on equal amounts of
minerals, 28 not whether a particular group eventually pays more because
it consumes more. The tax satisfied the third prong because both in-state
and out-of-state consumers paid the same rate of tax.
Similarly, appellants' fourth prong argument was against the tax rate
and subsequent dollar amount realized by the state. The Supreme Court
reasoned that general support and upkeep of a civilized government,
which includes providing police and fire protection, a trained work force,
and other advantages of a civilized society, are valid reasons for a tax.
Additionally, the tax compensates a state for depletion of its resources
and inherent wealth. Due process does not require that taxes collected
from a particular activity be reasonably related to the value of state
services provided to that activity.29
The Court concluded that when a tax is a percentage of the value of
coal severed, it is in proper proportion to the taxpayer's activities within
that state.3" The percentage rate of a tax is a political question more
appropriately resolved in the political arena. Courts should not be involved
with the type of fact finding required to balance competing interests in
order to arrive at an acceptable tax rate.
Although the holding on the fourth prong issue was not contrary to
previous applications of the test in CompleteAuto, Departmentof Revenue
of Washington v. Association of Stevedoring Companies,31 and JapanLine,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,32 it made definitive that which was only
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.at 618.
29. Id. at 622. The Court there stated that any other view would involve abandonment of the
principle that taxes and the government which they support are for the common good.
30. Id. at 624.
31. 435 U.S. 734 (1978). However, the tax in this case was only 1%.
32. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). However, the case found the law in question unconstitutional on grounds
that do not apply in Commonwealth Edison.
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alluded to previously. That is, as long as a tax is levied as a fixed
percentage, it is unlikely that the tax will be deemed to exceed the benefits
provided by the state or to unfairly burden interstate commerce. Justice
opened up the
Blackmun, in his dissent, stated that the Court's decision
33
impose.
to
wished
legislatures
which
rate
any
tax to
On the supremacy clause issue, appellants argued that the tax was
invalid because it substantially frustrated the purposes of the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920 by reducing the amount of royalty payments
to the federal government. 34 The Court, however, found the tax consistent
with the supremacy clause. The Montana tax does not frustrate the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act 35 merely by resulting in reduction of royalty payments
to the federal government.36 No language in the Act indicated that Congress intended to maximize and capture all economic rents from federally
leased mineral lands. The Court also rejected appellants' contention that
the tax frustrates the national energy policies of encouraging greater use
of coal and reduction in demand for petroleum products. 37 The Court
reasoned that Congress did not intend to preempt all state legislation
which might adversely impact on coal use.
CONCLUSION
This case provides energy rich states a greater edge in the struggle
between the states with energy resources and the consumers in states
without energy resources. The appellants in their Jurisdiction Statement
argued that the "OPEC like Revenue Maximization" of Montana would
lead to Balkanization between resource-rich and resource-poor states with
subsequent efforts at retaliation.38 It is certainly a volatile issue. 39
The states using resources upon which severance taxes have been levied
worry about the effects of energy prices on industrial growth and private
33. 453 U.S. 609, 645 (1981). Justice Blackmun in his dissent also points out that the question
presented was not whether appellants would succeed on the merits, but whether the appellants' case
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. However, it appears that the Court by deciding the
case on the merits, or on the briefs and pleadings since the case was dismissed below, was saving
the trouble of having to hear it again later.
34. Id. at 629.
35. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1920 Act). The Court referred
to § 32 of the Act as providing for state imposition of severance taxes on federal leases. The federal
preemption issue was probably important enough to bring up at the trial because 3/4 of the coal in
Montana belongs to the federal government. Appellants, Statement of the Case, supra note 20.
36. This view was affirmed in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, __ U.S. __, 102 S.Ct. (1982).
37. See Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1976).
38. Appellants, Jurisdiction Statement, 49 U.S.L.W. 4957 and 453 U.S. 609, 643 (1981).
39. This is evidenced by the number of amicus curaie briefs filed when the case eventually reached
the Supreme Court. Among those who filed on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants were: Tex., Kan.,
N.J., Minn., Iowa, Mich., Wis., Crow Tribe of Indians, members of Congress from 10 states. 453
U.S. 609, 611 (1981).
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consumers in those states.40 On the other hand, western states, whose
primary revenue raising and wealth sustaining assets are their resources,
need to provide for the future when the resources are depleted or no
longer demanded.
Arguably, a contrary decision in this case would have invited a flood
of commerce clause claims. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the states
should feel free to enact statutes similar to that of Montana or to raise
existing statutory tax rates. The political process is the only check remaining on these rates. With the present membership in the United States
Supreme Court, and the projected conservative membership in the near
future, it is unlikely that the Court will reverse the present trend of giving
states more leeway to steer their own courses. However, a cautionary
note, unchecked rates could force Congress to put a ceiling on the tax
levels through direct ceiling legislation or some type of preemptive legislation in a backlash against the less densely populated resource rich
western states. 4'
KAREN L. JENNINGS

40. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the State of Texas in Support of Jurisdictional Statement. 453
U.S. 609, 611 (1981).
41. This possibility was pointed out in the concurring opinion by Justice White. 453 U.S. 609,
638 (1981).

